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ABSTRACT 
BGP Blackhole routing is a mechanism used to protect 
networks from DDoS attacks. During the last several years, 
a number of variations of BGP Blackhole routing have been 
proposed. However, even though these methods have been used 
by many organizations and ISPs for some years, the academic 
community has provided only a limited evaluation of BGP 
Blackhole routing, using mainly network simulations. 
The objective of this research was to evaluate the 
basic methods of BGP Blackhole routing in a real test-bed 
network in various environments. By using the response 
time, the CPU load, and the link load as performance 
metrics, we first evaluated the performance of those 
methods in networks where the routers’ CPU load was the 
limiting factor. Then we examined the effect of the high 
link load and the effect of routers’ preconfiguration on 
the BGP Blackhole routing’s performance. 
The results showed that the BGP Blackhole routing may 
not be effective under stressful situations, that is, a 
high link load, because its dependence on TCP and the 
underlying routing protocols. Of the three basic Blackhole 
routing methods, the best method is the destination-based, 
followed closely by the source-based. The third method, 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
One of the most frequently used types of attack on 
computer networks is the Denial of Service (DoS) attack. A 
DoS attack’s main task is to stop a network device from 
providing specific legitimate services. This is usually 
accomplished by sending malformed traffic to the target or 
by sending a huge amount of normal traffic which will 
overload the target’s buffer. To be more effective, 
attackers often use many compromised machines, rather than 
just one, as a source for the attack. Thus the malicious 
packets approach the victim from different locations. This 
special type of DoS, called Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS), is one of the most difficult problems affecting 
normal operations on the Internet. 
The economic implications of DDoS attacks are very 
significant. The FBI’s 2004 annual report on cyber crime, 
which is based on information provided by nearly five 
hundred organizations, found that a fifth of the victims 
that suffered financial losses had experienced DoS attacks. 
The total lost for the companies was over $26 million 
(Mirkovic and others 2005, 10). According to Anna 
Claiborne, a representative of Prolexic Technologies, in 
2006 one major U.S. corporation lost over $2 million in a 
twenty-hour outage and an offshore gambling company lost an 
estimated $4 million in three days (Claiborne 2006, 18). 
During the last several years, there has been a constant 
demand for solutions to this serious problem and many 
different defense methods have been proposed. 
One of the methods used by large network operators to 
block malicious DDoS packets is BGP Blackhole 
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routing/filtering. Most modern routers have a special 
pseudo- interface, usually called Null0, which is always up 
and can never forward or receive traffic. Whenever a packet 
is pointed to Null0 it will be dropped, so this interface 
can be used to discard undesirable traffic. This method is 
more efficient than the use of Access Control Lists (ACLs), 
because it has no overhead and uses the highly optimized 
routing procedure of the router. 
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the dominant 
protocol used for exterior routing between autonomous 
systems (AS) on the Internet. When BGP is running inside an 
AS, it is referred to as the internal BGP (iBGP). The BGP 
is very powerful and gives network administrators many 
options to apply as routing policies. Two routers that both 
speak BGP maintain a TCP connection in order to exchange 
information, such as routing advertisements. 
The implementation of BGP Blackhole routing is 
relatively easy. In every router that is to apply Blackhole 
routing, a static route to the Null interface has been 
previously added. The static route uses a reserved, or 
private, IP address (e.g., 192.168.0.0/16). Another BGP-
speaking router is used as a trigger. When a node inside 
the network is under attack, the trigger router is manually 
configured to advertise a new route. The advertisement says 
that, for the victim’s IP address, the next-hop is the 
reserved/private address noted above. But since this 
address points to the Null interface, the victim’s IP 
address also will point to the Null interface. 
The main idea behind the use of BGP Blackhole routing 
is to block DDoS traffic as early as possible, which, in 
the case of an autonomous system, means applying it on 
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border routers. These routers can handle more traffic, so 
they are more efficient in blocking a large amount of 
incoming packets. And since the traffic is blocked early, 
the AS is minimally affected by the attack. Since the 
target itself doesn’t receive any traffic, it is mostly 
still under DoS. Null routing does not discriminate between 
legitimate and malicious packets; it just drops everything 
that addressed the target. But since DDoS attacks also 
create collateral damage, BGP Blackhole routing mainly 
protects the neighbor network devices, that is, other 
nodes, routers, etc. 
In keeping with the principals explained above, ISPs 
and router vendors have proposed a number of variations of 
BGP Blackhole routing. However, even though these methods 
have been used by many organizations and ISPs for some 
years, the academic community has provided only a limited 
evaluation of BGP Blackhole routing, using mainly network 
simulations. In his Master’s thesis, Kleffman evaluated the 
performance of BGP Blackhole routing on the U.S. Department 
of Defense (DoD) Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router 
Network (NIPRnet), using software simulation (Kleffman 
2005, 107). 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a 
scientific evaluation and analysis of the various BGP 
Blackhole routing methods, based on data collected on a 
real test-bed network. For this task, we first define the 
performance metrics. Then we evaluate the BGP Blackhole 
routing methods under different attack traffics and 
different limiting factors. Furthermore, we analyze the 
effect of the Blackhole preconfiguration on the normal 
operation of the routers. 
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In this research we assume that the DDoS attack has 
been positively identified by either automatic or manual 
means. However, the details of this identification are not 
part of this research. Though this topic is very important 
and needs more detailed research that can only be 
accomplished in a separate Master’s thesis. 
This research concludes that, among the three basic 
BGP Blackhole routing methods, the destination-based method 
presents the best performance defined by the response time 
and routers’ CPU load. The second-best method is the 
source-based Blackhole routing. This method has a unique 
advantage among the three: it allows good traffic to reach 
the DDoS attack victim. But this aspect is not easy to 
implement in a real situation. Finally, the customer-
triggered Blackhole routing in all cases had the worst 
performance. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter II presents a more detailed explanation of DDoS 
attacks, BGP Blackhole routing methods, and the results of 
the most recent and detailed study of BGP Blackhole 
routing. Chapter III describes the methodology and the 
different test-bed network configurations we used in this 
research. Chapter IV presents the detailed results of this 
research. Chapter V provides conclusions and suggestions 
for future work. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter provides background information for this 
study. The first section describes the basic aspects of 
DoS/DDoS attacks and the most common techniques that 
attackers use. The second section presents the principles 
of BGP Blackhole routing and the different methods of 
implementation that have been proposed to protect a network 
from DDoS attacks. The third section presents the results 
from previous studies related to BGP Blackhole routing 
analysis. 
A. DOS/DDOS ATTACKS 
The purpose of DoS/DDoS attacks is to disrupt the 
services offered by a host in a network. DoS attacks take 
advantage of various weaknesses in the IP protocol stack 
(Vayner 2003, 41). The two basic ideas behind DoS/DDoS 
attacks are 1) to send some kind of malformed traffic in 
order to create an abnormal operation of a victim’s network 
services, or 2) to send a large amount of traffic, usually 
normal, in order to consume a victim’s network resources. 
The main distinctions between DoS and DDoS attacks are 
the source and the amount of the malicious traffic. In DoS 
attacks, the source is a single host, or a small group of 
hosts in the vicinity, and the traffic comes in much lower 
volume than in DDoS attacks. Since the source is limited, 
this kind of attack mostly exploits various software and 
design flaws (Vayner 2003, 41). A classic example of a DoS 
attack is the “Ping of Death.” An ICMP Echo request, or 
Ping, is usually 64 bytes in size. Most of the older 
computers could not handle a ping larger than 65,535 bytes, 
the maximum IP packet size. As a result, the reception of a 
6 
packet that size or larger would create a system crash on 
the receiving host. By fixing the software flaws and 
applying the latest patches, potential targets can protect 
themselves from most DoS attacks. In recent years, 
therefore, that type of DoS attack has become very 
uncommon.  
In contrast, in DDoS attacks, the attacker uses a very 
large number, usually hundreds, of compromised network 
systems that he has under his control to send a large 
amount of packets. In this case, the attacker exhausts the 
victim’s limited resources, such as the bandwidth, router-
processing capability, or network stack resources (Kleffman 
2005, 107). The compromised systems, called “zombies” in 
computer science jargon, are usually network hosts in which 
the attacker was able to install special malicious 
software. The software gives the attacker the ability to 
control the host through network commands. 
Very often, an attacker controls the “zombies” through 
other hosts, called Masters, and the communication might 
also be encrypted by the attacker to evade detection. 
 
 
Figure 1.   DDoS attack (From: Vayner 2003, 41) 
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A classic example of a DDoS attack is the SYN Flood 
attack designed to target servers. The attacker sends a 
large number of SYN packets through the compromised 
machines to a victim’s server. The packets all have a 
forged (“spoofed”) IP source address, so the server’s 
replies (SYN-ACK packets) will not be acknowledged with ACK 
packets. The victim’s queue will eventually fill up waiting 
for the ACK response from the attack machines and will not 
be able to service new TCP connections. 
A DDoS attack can also be accomplished without 
zombies, by using legitimate network hosts. An example of 
this technique is the ICMP echo reply attack. The attacker 
sends a stream of ICMP echo requests to various hosts 
(usually by broadcasting), using the same “spoofed” source 
IP address that belongs to the victim. As a result, all 
replies go to the target creating a traffic storm. 
 
 




While DoS attacks have existed for decades, DDoS 
attacks are relatively new. The first documented cases 
appeared in late 1999. DDoS attacks became famous more 
recently after a series of attacks on popular e-commerce 
web sites like Yahoo!, Buy.com, Amazon, and eBay. Most of 
the companies lost their availability to the Internet for 
anywhere from a few hours up to a few days, causing 
hundreds of millions of dollars in lost revenue. 
Because DDoS attacks have characteristics that 
differentiate them from other types of network attacks, 
these need to be taken into consideration when planning how 
to defend against them. 
1. For a number of reasons, in DDoS attacks, it is 
very difficult to locate the attacker. The malicious 
traffic has a spoofed source IP address; it is not coming 
directly from the attacker’s machine, but from hundreds of 
zombies. And between the zombies and the attacker are 
usually sited the “masters.” Also, the communication 
between all players can be encrypted. Finally, the general 
absence of cooperation between the ISPs and network 
administrators makes it very difficult, if not impossible, 
to backtrack packets. 
2. An attacker does not need to be technically 
sophisticated to launch a DDoS attack. Most of the tools 
for producing DDoS attacks are available for free on the 
Internet, and they are so simple that even teenagers can 
use them. In June 2001, for example, a web site, 
www.grc.com, became the target of a DDoS attack and was 
unavailable for many days. According to Steve Gibson, the 
web site owner, the attacker was a thirteen-year-old boy 
(Gibson 2005, 29). In February 2000, a series of DDoS 
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attacks to the popular sites eBay, Yahoo!, CNN, and many 
others was traced back to a fifteen-year-old boy from 
Canada (Vayner 2003, 41). 
3. It is easy to create zombies. There are many 
public-access computers with Internet access that are 
poorly protected against an unauthorized installation of 
malicious code. Places like universities, colleges, public 
libraries, and Internet cafés usually have many of these 
potential zombies. PCs whose owners are unaware of the 
basics of computer security can also become zombies. This 
can happen, for example, if someone accepts emails or files 
from untrustworthy sources without previously scanning the 
files with anti-virus applications. 
All the above characteristics make it difficult to 
defend against DDoS attacks. Existing DDoS defense 
techniques can be broken down into three main categories: 
prevention, detection, and response (Security Scape 2003, 
3). 
The first defense method, prevention, is all about 
stopping an attack before it starts. It requires the use of 
ingress and egress packet filtering based on the source IP 
address. The second method, detection, can be accomplished 
by a continuous monitoring of the network for patterns of 
attack. The patterns, such as abrupt changes in traffic for 
example, must be distinguished from normal network changes 
(Security Scape 2003, 3). After an attack has been 
identified, the final defensive action to be taken is a 
response. And the best response is to block, filter, or 
divert the malicious traffic away from the target. BGP 
Blackhole routing falls under this category of defense 
techniques. But a major problem with response mechanisms is 
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that it is not easy to distinguish attack packets from 
normal ones. Therefore, more often than not, the only 
solution is to apply the same action to all traffic going 
to the victim. 
B. BGP BLACKHOLE ROUTING 
BGP Blackhole routing is one of the defense mechanisms 
used to block DDoS attacks. It combines a common feature of 
almost all modern routers, the Null0 interface, with the 
BGP routing protocol in order to drop packets that travel 
to a specific host. 
Null0 is a pseudo-interface that every router has by 
default. It is always up but can never actually forward or 
receive traffic. Whenever a packet is routed to Null0, it 
will be dropped. Null0 works like the “/dev/null” directory 
in a UNIX Operating System. The main purpose of the 
interface is to discard undesirable traffic. Filtering 
through Null0 is a more efficient method than using Access 
Control Lists (ACLs), because it uses the highly optimized 
routing procedure of the router and thus incur much less 





Figure 3.   Use of Null0 interface (From: Battles, 
McPherson, and Morrow 2004, 47) 
 
The configuration for applying Blackhole routing is 
simple. The basic requirement is a static route of the 
destination IP address to be discarded. Figure 4 shows this 
configuration for Cisco routers. When traffic is send to 
the Null0 interface, since there is no real host to receive 
the packets, ICMP Unreachable replies are generated by 
default. To prevent this unnecessary traffic, we use the 
first two lines from Figure 4. The lines first specify the 
interface and then configure the router to not create ICMP 
Unreachable replies for this interface. 
The third line is the static route. In this example, 
the packets that have as their destination the subnet 




Figure 4.   Null0 routing (Cisco routers) (From: Raveendran 
Greene 2002, 10) 
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The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the most popular 
routing protocol used between Autonomous Systems (AS). It 
is very powerful and gives network administrators many 
options in applying routing policies. When used inside an 
AS, it is called an internal BGP (iBGP). Routers that speak 
BGP establish a TCP connection between themselves, so that 
the exchange of information is reliable. 
In BGP Blackhole routing, we want to block malicious 
traffic as early as possible. The best point to do so is 
the border routers. Usually, these are the most capable 
routing devices in a network, so they are the most 
efficient in handling large amount of packets. Furthermore, 
by discarding traffic at that point, we better protect our 
network, since no undesired traffic travels inside the AS. 
The basic implementation of BGP Blackhole routing 
requires a preconfiguration of all border routers with a 
static route entry to the Null0 interface, using a private 
IP subnet address that is not used on the Internet, e.g., 
192.0.0.0/24 (Battles, McPherson, and Morrow 2004, 47). A 
router inside the AS is also configured to work as trigger; 
it communicates with the border routers using iBGP. 
Although not specifically necessary, it is better to use a 
dedicated router for this purpose. It can be either a 
normal router or a workstation with software that can 
handle TCP/IP-based routing protocols like GNU Zebra or 
GateD (Battles, McPherson, and Morrow 2004, 47). 
To apply Blackhole routing, a special static route to 
the IP address of the victim needs to be added to the 
trigger router. The static route contains more information 
under a “tag.” Among this information, the most important 
is the “next-hop,” which for Blackhole routing needs to be 
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an IP address from the private subnet IP addresses already 
configured at the border routers. The trigger will 
automatically advertise the static route to the border 
routers, using an iBGP route update advertisement, and the 
border routers update their routing table with the new 
entry, forcing all traffic destined to the victim to be 
routed to the null interface. To stop Blackhole routing, 
simply remove the static route at the trigger router and 
the router will send out a route withdrawal to all border 
routers, again via iBGP. 
BGP Blackhole routing is not a perfect defense against 
DDoS attacks. Its most significant limitation is that it 
takes place on Layer 3 (Network Layer) and not on Layer 4 
(Transport Layer) of the TCP/IP protocol stack. This means 
that the Blackhole routing technique blocks traffic based 
only on IP address. It cannot be more discrete in its 
filtering, for example, by dropping only telnet or HTTP 
packets going to the victim. Another drawback is that it is 
very hard to bypass or provide exceptions to the filtering, 
since to do so we have to actually bypass the router’s 
forwarding table (Raveendran Greene 2002, 10). 
In the last few years, many variations to the basic 
Blackhole routing technique have been proposed, all of 
which can be categorized as one of two basic 
implementations: the Remote-Triggered (RTBH) and the 
Customer-Triggered. The main distinction between the two is 
the origination of the filtering command. RTBH routing can 
be further divided into either destination-based routing or 
source-based routing, depending on what information (the 
source or the destination IP address) is used to block 
traffic. 
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1. Remote-Triggered Blackhole Routing 
a. Destination-Based 
RTBH routing is the basic version of BGP 
Blackhole routing. The border routers need a static route 
to the Null0 interface using a test subnet IP address that 
is not used on the Internet. Figure 5 shows the 
configuration for a Cisco border router. As noted above, 
the use of the “no icmp unreachables” command is optional, 




Figure 5.   Border router set-up (From: Raveendran Greene 
2002, 10) 
 
The trigger router is installed at the Network 
Operations Center (NOC) and is better if dedicated for this 
purpose and to accept no routes. The basic configuration of 
the trigger router is shown in Figure 6. In that example, 
the router belongs to AS 109, the name of the static route-
map is “static-to-bgp”, and the “community no-export” 
command is used to deny advertisement of the Blackhole 




Figure 6.   Trigger router set-up (From: Raveendran Greene 
2002, 10) 
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The trigger router must talk iBGP to every border 
router. To activate the RTBH routing, we add a new static 
route to the trigger, using the same tag value as defined 
above. Figure 7 shows the command issued to the trigger 
router. In that example, the IP address 171.168.1.1/32 
belongs to the target to be protected. 
 
  
Figure 7.   Activation of trigger router (From: Raveendran 
Greene 2002, 10) 
 
When the static route reaches the border routers, 





Figure 8.   Activation of Blackhole routing (From: 













Figure 9.   Destination-Based RTBH routing (From: Cisco 
2005, 37) 
 
To disable the Blackhole routing, a new command 
must be issued to the trigger router, which removes the 
static route; the trigger router then sends out an iBGP 
withdrawal. 
b. Source-Based 
Source-based RTBH routing provides the ability to 
drop traffic based on either a specific source IP address 
or a range of source addresses (Cisco 2005, 37). This 
method allows legitimate traffic to reach the victim of the 
DDoS attack. Implementation of source-based RTBH routing 
depends on unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF), more 
often, loose mode uRPF. The router checks the source IP 
address of the packet and if there is no entry in the 
Forwarding Information Base (FIB) for the specific address, 




(Cisco 2005, 37). Figure 10 shows the command that has to 
be added to a Cisco router configuration file for every 
interface that needs to use uRPF. 
 
 
Figure 10.   uRPF command for Cisco routers 
 
The configuration of the border and trigger 
routers remains the same as in the destination-based 
method. The only difference is that, for the source-based 
routing, the uRPF must be configured on all external facing 
interfaces of the border routers. To activate the Blackhole 
routing, a static route must be added to the trigger 
router; but this time, the IP address (or range of 
addresses) of the attacker is used. The withdrawal 
procedure is the same as in the destination-based method. 
 
 




2. Customer-Triggered Blackhole Routing 
The main difference in customer-triggered Blackhole 
routing, as compared to RTBH routing, is that the 
activation does not come from a trigger router controlled 
by the ISP or AS administrator, but from a customer-owned 
device. 
This technique requires a pre-agreement between the 
ISP and the customer, because the latter needs information 
that is not usually available from ISPs. Thus, the ISP 
needs to properly configure the border routers to accept 
the customer’s iBGP advertisements. 
However, even though this method gives customers the 
ability to respond faster to a DDoS attack, the fact that 
the advertisements must pass through the same links as the 
DDoS attack is an indication of a potentially slower 
response. This was demonstrated by M. Kleffman’s thesis at 
the U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) (Kleffman 
2005, 107). It is illustrated by the analysis done in the 
present study. 
C. PREVIOUS STUDY OF BGP BLACKHOLE ROUTING 
As noted in the introduction, Blackhole routing has 
been used by ISPs and other network administrators for 
several years, but there are only a limited number of 
evaluations of the technique. The only detailed analysis is 
M. Kleffman’s thesis (Kleffman 2005, 107), which analyses 
the performance of BGP Blackhole routing on a network, such 
as the Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNET) used by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). 
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Figure 12.   Simulated NIPRNET network, printed from OpNet 
Modeler application (From: Kleffman 2005, 107) 
 
NIPRNET is a virtual network connecting smaller 
networks around the world. Each of the smaller networks is 
connected to a border router owned by the Defense 
Information Systems Agency (DISA) that is connected to the 
Internet. The border routers are also connected to each 
other via a Virtual Private Network (VPN). Even though the 
study focuses mainly on NIPRENET, some of the results are 
applicable generally to traditional networks like the 
Internet. 
1. Goals and Methodology 
Kleffman’s main goals were to: determine if BGP 
Blackhole routing was effective in defending NIPRNET 
against DDoS attacks; determine the effectiveness of 
Blackhole routing with one or more border routers out of 
the defense mechanism; and determine the effectiveness of 
customer-triggered against remote-triggered Blackhole 
routing. 
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The evaluation method Kleffman used was a simulation 
based on OpNet Modeler version 10.5 (Kleffman 2005, 107), 
in which the simulated network consisted of six border 
routers, a trigger router, and twelve customer routers. The 
customers were equivalent USAF Bases. The bandwidth of the 
communication links varied from 9 Mbps up to 40 Mbps. 
Four different workloads were defined. The first was 
normal operations traffic based on real data obtained from 
the Air Force Network Operations Center (AFNOC). This was 
the baseline workload. The other three workloads consisted 
of the baseline workload plus DDoS attack traffic of 12.8 
Mbps, 38.4 Mbps, and 64 Mbps, respectively, which 
originated from six attack systems (Kleffman 2005, 107).  
In all the scenarios a non-response period of ten seconds 
between the DDoS attacks’ initiation and the Blackhole 
routing advertisements simulated the IDS response time. A 
total of 39 different experiments were executed. 
The performance metrics chosen were: 
1. Queuing delays on each router, 
2. Latency between the bases (customer routers) and 
the border routers and between the trigger router 
and the border routers, 
3. Router convergence delay, and  
4. Bandwidth utilization on the links between the 
bases and the border routers. 
2. Results 
a. Effectiveness of BGP Blackhole Routing on 
NIPRNET 
The first result demonstrated the effectiveness 
of BGP Blackhole routing. Initially, the utilization and 
the latency inside the NIPRNET were measured with the 
baseline traffic. Then, after applying the Blackhole 
routing, they were measured with the three different DDoS 
21 
attack scenarios. The simulation showed that, inside the 
NIPRNET, the utilization and the latency remained the same. 
Next, the queuing delay of the border routers was 
measured. The results showed that, with increasing traffic, 
the respective queuing-delay increases were very small. 
This suggests that the impact the BGP Blackhole routing had 
on the queuing delays of the border routers was related to 
the increase in attack traffic, not to the actual dropping 
of the packets (Kleffman 2005, 107). 
The measurements of the utilization, latency, and 
queuing delay all confirm that the BGP Blackhole routing 
was effective in protecting the NIPRNET. 
b. Effectiveness of BGP Blackhole Routing 
without All the Border Routers Participating 
The next step was the evaluation of BGP Blackhole 
Routing when only some of the border routers were 
participating in the filtering. For this measurement, four 
different scenarios were simulated. In the first scenario, 
the NIPRNET was defended by only the border router directly 
connected to the target base. In the next three scenarios, 
a combination of one, three, and five out of a total of six 
border routers (not directly connected to the target) was 
chosen. 
The first metric analyzed was the inbound 
bandwidth utilization. The measurements showed that 
utilization increased up to 100 percent as the number of 
defending routers decreased. The only exception was when 
the border router directly connected to the target 
participated in the filtering procedure: in that case, the 
utilization didn’t change. But that result occurred because  
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the NIPRNET is not a traditional AS, but rather a VPN 
connection of smaller networks spread around the world that 
are not directly connected to one another. 
Next, the queuing delay on the border routers and 
the inbound latency of the communication links under attack 
were measured for the same scenarios. The simulation showed 
that the queuing delay increased, but in such a small 
percentage that it should not have a major impact on the 
performance of the network (Kleffman 2005, 107). 
The latency also increased, both because of the 
queuing delay and, in some cases, because of the link 
saturation. The latter happened when the DDoS attack 
workload was much higher than the bandwidth of the link and 
the directly connected border router didn’t participate in 
the filtering. 
The simulation’s least surprising result was that 
the Blackhole routing was not as effective when only some 
of the border routers participated in the filtering. 
Furthermore, the bandwidth of the communication link under 
attack plays an important role, especially as the attack 
traffic becomes larger (Kleffman 2005, 107). 
c. Comparison of Remote-Triggered with 
Customer-Triggered Blackhole Routing on 
NIPRNET 
For the Remote-Triggered Blackhole routing, the 
topology remained the same as that discussed in the 
previous sections. For the Customer-Triggered Blackhole 
routing, the updating of the border routers started from 
the router of the base under attack. First, the study 
measured the convergence time on the routers, which, in the 
case of Customer-Triggered Blackhole routing, showed a 
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significant increase in the values of that metric. Although 
in the RTBH filtering, the maximum convergence never 
exceeded the 32 milliseconds, in the second method, the 
maximum convergence boosted to more than 45 seconds. That 
result by itself is enough to show the advantage of RTBH 
routing. 
The study also compared the bandwidth 
utilization, the queuing delay on border routers, and the 
latency. All three metrics show increased values with the 
Customer-Triggered Blackhole routing methodology, 
especially in high-volume attacks. In the case of a 64-Mbps 
attack, the queuing delay elevated from microseconds to 
seconds (Kleffman 2005, 107). 
3.  Comments 
This paper shows that BGP Blackhole routing is 
effective as a defense mechanism against DDoS attacks on 
the NIPRNET. And since the Internet and traditional 
networks have the same basic principles as the NIPRNET, the 
effectiveness of Blackhole routing would apply also to 
them, perhaps with even better results. 
While Kleffman’s thesis provided very useful results, 
it was based on a simulation. Simulation is an excellent 
analysis tool, especially in cases in which the real thing 
cannot be tested or is very difficult to be created. But 
simulations also have some disadvantages. The most 
important drawback is that they are based on 
simplifications and assumptions. Theoretically, depending 
on how good the simulation is, the simplifications do not 
affect results. But in order to accept the data provided by 
a simulation, there must be a minimum base of experimental 
data that points to the same results. One of the main  
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objectives of our thesis is to provide that experimental 
data and either verify or call into question the 
conclusions of Kleffman’s thesis. 
Another shortcoming of simulations is that they 
usually do not show unexpected or hidden results based on 
the irregular behavior of the test object. For example, 
when some routers work under extreme traffic, they might 
present unstable behavior that affects their performance 
but that can only be shown in real experiments. 
Simulations are very demanding applications, as they 
are highly dependent on the performance of the computer 
within which they are installed. Furthermore, OpNet is a 
discrete event simulation and as such it uses event times 
based on calculated or expected delays which can present 
variations from the real values. 
To do a more complete analysis of BGP Blackhole 
routing, measurements on a real test-bed network must be 
taken and then be compared to those of the simulation. Our 
thesis tries, in part, to address that issue. 
Since the router is the main player in BGP Blackhole 
routing, its performance is a very important factor and 
must be analyzed. Kleffman’s study does not address the 
issue. Here, we analyze how the router performance, in 
terms of the CPU load, affects the Blackhole routing. This 
metric is more generic and thus more useful. Furthermore, 
we analyze the effect of link load on Blackhole routing. 
Depending on the devices used in a network, the limiting 
factors (i.e., the CPU load and the link load) can produce 
varying results. Therefore, we examine both factors. 
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One of the main shortcomings of BGP Blackhole routing 
is the absence of an automation initialization procedure. 
At present, after identifying an attack, the network 
administrator has to manually add the static route to the 
trigger router. This obviously increases the response time. 
In every one of its simulation scenarios, the AFIT study 
assumes that there is an IDS/IPS that identifies attacks 
and, after ten seconds, initiates the Blackhole routing. 
But the study does not explain how this can actually be 
implemented. That issue, if solved, would greatly increase 
the effectiveness of Blackhole routing. For this reason, we 
investigated possible solutions to the automation problem. 
As noted, Kleffman’s thesis focuses mainly on the 
NIPRNET, though some of the results may also apply to more 
generic networks like the Internet. But that possibility 
must be evaluated and confirmed. In our study, therefore, 
we use a more generic real test-bed network in order to 
verify the AFIT study results and also produce additional 
results that give a more detailed picture of the BGP 
Blackhole routing methodology. In the next chapter, we 
present a detailed description of our methodology and the 
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III. GOALS AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the goals of our research and 
the methodology we used to accomplish them. As noted 
previously, the methodology that best fit our goals was 
data collection and analysis from real test-bed networks. 
The details of these networks, starting from their basic 
configuration up to the data collection, are all explained 
in the following pages. 
A. GOALS 
This research had four goals: 
1. Describe the proposed methods of BGP Blackhole 
routing. 
2. Define performance metrics that can be used to 
evaluate the BGP Blackhole routing methods. 
3. Evaluate those methods using the performance 
metrics defined above. 
4. Analyze the effect of pre-configuration on 
routers normal operations. 
In the previous chapter, the proposed methods of BGP 
Blackhole routing were described in detail. In this 
chapter, the performance metrics and the test-bed networks 
we used are described. The final results of this research 
are presented in Chapter IV. 
Before continuing, we must clarify an important aspect 
of our research. Though the identification of a DDoS attack 
is closely related to our work, it is not part of this 
thesis. During the data collection from the different test-
bed networks that we created, we assumed that the DDoS 
attack had been positively identified by other means, i.e., 




traffic inside the network. In either case, the attack 
information is passed to the proper authority, which, in 
our case, is the network administrator. 
The reason we do not include this topic in our thesis 
is that, because it is such an important and difficult 
issue, it merits a dedicated study in its own right. 
B. PERFORMANCE METRICS 
The performance metrics chosen for this research were: 
the router response time, the router CPU load, and the link 
load. 
The router response time is the time between the 
moment when the static route to a victim’s IP address is 
entered manually or automatically in the trigger router and 
the moment when the border routers update their routing 
tables with the new static route entry. DDoS attacks can be 
initiated almost instantaneously and with no indication on 
the victim’s side of an incoming attack. In other cases 
(Gibson 2005, 29), the attack may gradually increase. In 
any case, the network must be able to respond quickly. The 
router response time is the most important performance 
metric, because it shows how fast a network can be 
protected from a DDoS attack. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Kleffman’s thesis 
shows, the effectiveness of BGP Blackhole routing is 
degraded when not all border routers are participating 
(Kleffman 2005, 107). In light of that factor, in our 
research we assumed that all the border routers were part 
of the Blackhole routing defense mechanism, and we did not 
examine the issue any further. 
29 
In the process of our initial tests with simulated 
DDoS attacks, we realized that there are two factors that 
affect the performance of BGP Blackhole routing: the router 
CPU load and the link load. 
The router CPU load is a limiting factor when the 
malicious traffic is much higher in volume than the 
router’s forwarding capability. When the routers are more 
capable, the links inside the network usually become 
congested, and as such, are a limiting factor. In our 
research we investigated the performance of BGP Blackhole 
routing in both situations. 
Since all proposed BGP Blackhole routing methods 
require preconfiguration in both the trigger router and the 
border router, we analyzed the effect of this 
preconfiguration on routers’ normal operation. As a metric 
for the comparison, we used the routers’ CPU load. 
C. NETWORK CONFIGURATION 
The main methodology used for this research included 
the simulation of DDoS attack scenarios in different real 
test-bed networks and data collection of performance 
metrics with the use of proper tools. This was accomplished 
in three steps. The first step was to set up appropriate 
test-bed networks that would simulate real DDoS attacks and 
BGP Blackhole routing scenarios. The second step was to use 
appropriate hardware and software to create malicious 
traffic. The third and final step was to use appropriate 
applications and methods to collect the data defined by the 





1. Hardware and Software 
For the test-bed networks we used the following 
devices: 
1. Five Cisco 2621XM routers with IOS 12.3(15b). 
Each router had 32Mb of Flash memory, 32Mb of RAM 
memory, four 10Mbps Ethernet interfaces, and two 
100Mbps Fast Ethernet interfaces. 
2. One Cisco 3600 router with IOS 12.2(5d), 16Mb of 
Flash memory, 16Mb of RAM memory, eight 10Mbps 
Ethernet interfaces, and one 100Mbps Fast 
Ethernet interface. 
3. One Juniper J4300 router with JUNOS 7.1R1.3, 
256MB of Flash memory, 256MB of RAM memory, and 
six 100Mbps Fast Ethernet interfaces. 
4. One Cisco Catalyst 1900 switch with twenty-four 
10Mbps interfaces. 
5. One D-Link DGS-1004T switch with four gigabit 
interfaces. 
6. One SmartBits 6000C Performance Analysis System 
of Spirent Communications for use as a traffic 
generator. 
7. One LAN-3321A TeraMetrics XD module with two 
10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet Copper ports and two 
Gigabit Ethernet Fiber ports installed on the 
SmartBits 6000C system.  
8. One desktop PC, acting as the target. 
9. One laptop PC, acting as the network analyzer, 
installed with all the applications noted below. 
The applications we used during the various tests are 
the following: 
1. SmartWindow version 7.70.128, for use with the 
SmartBits 6000C system. 
2. SolarWinds Standard Edition version 8.2, for 
network management and analysis. 





4. Kiwi Syslog Deamon version 8.0.2 of Kiwi 
Enterprises, for capturing SNMP messages. 
5. Ethereal version 0.10.14, for capturing normal 
traffic. 
2. Test-Bed Networks 
To evaluate the performance of the BGP Blackhole 
routing methods, we created three different test-bed 
networks. The first test-bed network was used to measure 
the performance of the two basic remote-triggered BGP 
Blackhole routing methods: destination-based filtering and 
source-based filtering. This network was also used to 
analyze the effect of the router CPU load as a limiting 
factor inside the network. 
The second test-bed network was used to measure the 
performance of the customer-triggered Blackhole routing. 
The effect of the router CPU load was also measured. 
The third test-bed network was used to measure the 
effectiveness of BGP Blackhole routing when the limiting 
factor was the link load. 
a.  Test-Bed Network #1 
As noted above, the main task of test-bed network 
#1 was to evaluate the performance of destination-based and 
source-based RTBH routing. The main idea was to create a 
DDoS attack from the packet generator that would target a 
host inside an Autonomous System (AS). The malicious 
traffic would approach the AS from different sources and 
thus had to pass through different border routers. After 
the initialization of the attack, the trigger router inside 
the AS was configured to advertise either destination- or 
source-based Blackhole routing. Using analysis tools, we 
then measured the response time of each border router under 
different amounts of attack traffic. Using the same tools, 
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we also measured the router CPU load under different 
volumes of attack traffic and analyzed the effect it had on 
the average response time. 
Using the available hardware, we simulated an AS 
with three border routers, two internal routers, one 
trigger router, and one desktop PC as the target of the 
attack. All the routers were the Cisco 2621XM model except 
the one closest to the target, which was a Cisco 3600 
model. One laptop PC with the analysis tools was connected 
to the latter router. The three border routers were 
connected to the SmartBits packet generator’s two 
interfaces, either directly or through a Cisco 1900 switch. 
All interfaces in the network were 10Mbps Ethernet. The 
test-bed network is presented in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Test-bed network #1 
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The main routing protocol used inside the network 
was OSPF. To advertise the Blackhole routing, the trigger 
router had iBGP peer-to-peer connections with the border 
routers. 
With the obvious exception of different IP- 
address assignments for the interfaces, the configuration 
of the three border routers was the same. The same was true 
for the two internal routers. The actual configuration 
files of one internal router, one border router, and the 
trigger router for test-bed network #1 are presented in 
Appendix A. 
b.  Test-Bed Network #2 
The main purpose of test-bed network #2 was to 
evaluate the customer-triggered Blackhole routing and then 
compare it to the remote-triggered Blackhole routing. The 
topology remained almost the same as that of test-bed 
network #1; the only difference was the position of the 
trigger router. To simulate a customer network inside the 
AS, we positioned the trigger router in line with the 
target host. The trigger router in this case thus also 
played the role of the border router for the small 
customer’s network. 
The details of the proper authorization for the 
customer to communicate with the AS border routers did not 
affect our evaluation; that is more an issue of agreement 
between either the ISP or the AS network administrator and 
the customer. 
The topology of test-bed network #2 is presented 
in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14.   Test-bed network #2 
 
The configuration file of the trigger router in 
test-bed network #2 is presented in Appendix B. 
c.  Test-Bed Network #3 
The purpose of test-bed network #3 was to 
evaluate the performance of BGP Blackhole routing in a 
network where the routers have sufficient CPU capacity, so 
the limiting factor could be the link load, not the router 
CPU load. For this network we used four Cisco 2621XM models 
(three border routers and a trigger router), one Juniper 
J4300, one D-Link Gigabit switch, a desktop PC as the 
target, and a laptop PC with the analysis tools. The 
topology of the network is presented in Figure 15. 
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Figure 15.   Test-bed network #3 
 
The links target-J4300 and the switch-SmartBits 
were configured to 100 Mbps; the link J4300-switch was 
configured to 10Mbps. All the routers used OSPF as the main 
routing protocol; iBGP sessions were also established 
between the border routers and the trigger. 
Since both the Juniper J4300 router (unlike the 
Cisco 3600) and the gigabit switch were able to handle much 
more than the 10Mbps traffic, by downgrading the link 
J4300-switch to 10Mbps we created a bottleneck link inside 
the network. And thus the link load became the limiting 
factor. 
The main idea for this experiment was to load the 
link J4300-switch with different traffic loads and then 
apply Blackhole routing. The iBGP updates of the trigger 
router to the border routers had to pass through the loaded 
link. Using the tools and methodology explained in 
subsequent pages, we measured the effect of the link load 
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on the three border-routers’ response times. In this 
network the BGP Blackhole routing didn’t actually block the 
malicious traffic, but this was not the objective of the 
evaluation. 
The basic configuration of the trigger router and 
the border routers were the same as in the previous test-
bed networks. The configuration of the Juniper J4300 router 
is presented in Appendix C. 
D. TRAFFIC GENERATION 
To properly evaluate the various BGP Blackhole routing 
methods, we had to create DDoS attacks for all of the test-
bed networks described above. The hardware available for 
this task was the SmartBits 6000C Performance Analysis 
System of Spirent Communications, with one LAN-3321A 
TeraMetrics XD module with two 10/100/1000 Mbps Ethernet 
Copper ports and two Gigabit Ethernet Fiber ports. The 
device is capable of creating customized layer-three and 
layer-four packets in IPv4 and IPv6 formats. Furthermore, 
it allows users to customize layer-two information (i.e., 
source and destination MAC address). All the ports of the 
module can send and receive traffic simultaneously (full 
duplex), and the interfaces can act as regular hosts inside 
a network. To control the system, we used the SmartWindow 
version 7.70.128 Graphical User Interface (GUI) 




Figure 16.   SmartWindow GUI 
 
In the initial configuration of the test-bed networks 
we also used the CommView 5.1 network monitor and analyzer 
application of Tamosoft. The main features of this product 
that were most valuable to us were the packet generator and 
traffic capture capability. The application didn’t have the 
capability to send the amount of traffic we needed, but the 
user-friendly interface helped us create the traffic that 
was most efficient for our purposes in a very short time. 
With CommView we created two custom ICMP Echo-Request 
packets to be used by the packet generator for the DDoS 
attack. In both cases, the destination IP address was that 
of the target, but the source IP address was either the 
same as the destination or one that wasn’t assigned to any 
host inside the test-bed network and for which only the 
last bit of the IP address was different from the 
destination IP address. The use of these two specific fake-
source IP addresses prevented the ICMP Echo-Replies from 
traveling inside the network and thus altering the 
measurements. For the initial task of this network, only 
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one of the custom packets was needed. But after our first 
experiments we observed that, depending on the source IP 
address of the packet, the filtering on the border routers 
resulted in different CPU loads. So, to further investigate 
this phenomenon we used two custom packets. A hexadecimal 
form of one of the packets is presented in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17.   Custom ICMP Echo-Request packet 
 
Using the packets described above, we then created the 
attack flows with the SmartBits application. Thirteen 
attack flows were defined, with different amounts of 
traffic, starting from a small number of frames per second 
(fps) up to the maximum capability of the packet generator 
for the specific connections we created. Each flow was 
divided equally into three parts, so that only a third of 
the total traffic would pass through a single border 
router. For the final flow, we used the maximum bit- rate 
of the packet generator in every port, thus the right-side 
border router had to handle an amount of traffic that was 
equal to the traffic of both the other border routers 




Flow # Total Frame Rate (fps) 
Total Bit Rate  
(Mbps) 
1 1500 0.89 
2 3000 1.77 
3 4500 2.66 
4 6000 3.54 
5 7500 4.43 
6 9000 5.32 
7 10500 6.20 
8 12000 7.09 
9 12780 7.55 
*10 12900 7.63 
*11 16500 9.74 
*12 19134 11.33 
*13 25511 15.10 
Table 1.   Attack Flows 
 
Flow #9 was the maximum flow under which the CPU load 
of every router was below 80 percent in test-bed network 
#1. Above this level some of the routers reached a maximum 
CPU load and their behavior became very unstable. Because 
of that, we assume that Flows #10 through #13 simulate more 
accurately a DDoS attack in networks where the limiting 
factor is the router CPU load. All thirteen flows were used 
in both test-bed network #1 and #2. 
For test-bed network #3 we needed the same packets, 
but with different volumes of traffic. Therefore, on the 
SmartBits packet generator we defined ten attack flows 
(from 1 Mbps up to 10Mbps, spaced at 1-Mbp intervals), 
using the two custom ICMP echo-request packets. This 
traffic gave us the ability to load the link J4300-switch 
on test-bed network #3 to its maximum capacity. Also, the 
1-Mbp intervals produced more clear and useful results. 
E. DATA COLLECTION 
The main performance metric for this research was the 
response time of the routers. And the most accurate way to 
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measure those values was to capture the trigger router’s 
initial routing-advertisement update and the border 
routers’ subsequent routing update messages. The messages 
were associated with the internal clock of each router. If 
the clocks were synchronized properly, the times for us to 
extract the information we needed would be accurate. 
To synchronize the clocks in the routers, we used NTP 
protocol. The trigger router was configured to act as an 
NTP server; all the other routers were configured to take 
time information from the trigger router. This 
configuration gave us a millisecond precision that was very 
accurate for our measurements. Furthermore, since we didn’t 
evaluate the response time between each of the routers, but 
instead evaluated the response time as an average of all 
three of the border routers in comparison to different 
attack flows, any possible timing bias of a router would 
not affect the results. 
The messages of the trigger router and the border 
routers were collected using the Simple Network Management 
Protocol (SNMP), the “debug” command on the Cisco routers, 
and the Kiwi Syslog Deamon version 8.0.2 application on the 
laptop PC. The “debug” command allows users to specify 
different kinds of messages to be produced by a router, to 
help administrators analyze, evaluate, or resolve a 
situation. The messages are created and transmitted 
according to the SNMP protocol. For our purposes, we used 
the “debug IP routing” and “debug BGP” options of the 
“debug” command that produce messages related to the 
routing information and to the BGP protocol. 
The Kiwi Syslog Deamon is a freeware Windows 
application that receives, logs, and forwards Syslog 
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messages from any Syslog-enabled device, like a router. 
Figure 18 presents an example of the messages captured 
during the application and the subsequent removal of 
destination-based Blackhole routing. 
The IP addresses of the trigger router’s lone 
interface and the target host are 192.168.100.2 and 
192.168.200.2, respectively. The addresses of the border 
routers’ trigger facing interfaces are 192.168.2.1, 
192.168.7.2, and 192.168.6.2, respectively. In each border 
router the subnet 192.0.2.0/24 defines the static route to 
Null0. The address 192.0.2.1 is used by the trigger router 
as the “next-hop” in the BGP advertisements. The response 
time for a border router is the difference between the 
logging time of the trigger messages and the logging time 
of route update messages from that border router. In the 




Figure 18.   Example of debug messages after application and 
removal of destination-based Blackhole routing 
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The second performance metric we measured was the 
router CPU load. For this purpose we used the SolarWinds 
version 8.2 application, which is a network analysis, 
management, and monitoring software that comes with a 
variety of tools specified for different tasks. The most 
useful of these tools for monitoring the router CPU load is 
the “Router CPU load” version 8.0.15, which uses the SNMP 
protocol to query and get replies from properly configured 
routers. It then presents in graphical form the CPU load of 
every device either in real time or on average. Figure 19 
shows an example of this tool during 7.09-Mbps total attack 
traffic in test-bed network #1. 
 
 
Figure 19.   Example of 5 routers’ CPU loads under 7.09-Mbps 
total attack traffic 
 
As noted above, for very high attack traffic (Flows 
#10–#13 in Table 1), the CPU load on some of the routers 
reached values of more than 90 percent. As a result, the 
“Router CPU load” tool couldn’t provide accurate 
measurements for these routers as SNMP depends on TCP to 
function and TCP breaks down when the CPU utilization of 
the routers is too high. For these cases we used a direct 
connection with the routers through Console port and Hyper 




cpu history", we were able to collect data about the CPU 
load for the last sixty seconds. Figure 20 presents an 
example of the printout. 
 
 
Figure 20.   CPU load history on Cisco routers 
 
From the SolarWinds application, we also used the 
“Bandwidth Gauges” version 8.0.26 tool, which, by using the 
SNMP protocol again, presented real-time traffic-load 
monitoring. For each device we specified the interface we 
were interested in and the tool showed the average traffic 
(logarithmic or linear bps) and the average percent 
utilization. Figure 21 presents an example of the printout 
during 7.09-Mbps attack traffic. 
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Figure 21.   Example of Bandwidth Gauges tool during 7.09-
Mbps attack traffic 
 
In this chapter we explained the methodology we used 
in our research. We described the hardware and software we 
used to create the DDoS attack traffic and the applications 
we used to collect the data. In the next chapter we present 





In this chapter we present the results of our 
research. In the first section, we present an evaluation of 
the three basic BGP Blackhole routing methods (RTBH 
destination-based, RTBH source-based, and customer-
triggered Blackhole routing) under low to medium attack 
traffic as compared to the capabilities of the routers 
inside our test-bed network. 
In the second section, we present an evaluation of the 
same methods under extreme traffic. This division of the 
evaluations into two sections is necessary for two reasons. 
First, the unstable behavior of the routers imposed 
different approaches for collecting the data required for 
the evaluations. Second, the results in the evaluation of 
the high-traffic cases were in many ways different from 
those under low-to-medium attack traffic. 
The third section of this evaluation concerns the 
performance of BGP Blackhole routing in a network where the 
limiting factor is not the routers’ CPU load, as in the 
previous two cases, but instead is the link load. 
In the final section of this chapter, we compare the 
preconfiguration of the routers for the three basic BGP 
Blackhole routing methods. To achieve this goal, we examine 
the effect of the preconfiguration on the routers before 
the application of any BGP Blackhole routing. 
B. COMPARISON OF BASIC BGP BLACKHOLE ROUTING METHODS 
UNDER LOW-TO-MEDIUM ATTACK TRAFFIC 
From test-bed networks #1 and #2, the data collected 
was related to the response time of the three border 
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routers under varying amounts of attack traffic. As noted 
in the previous chapter, we specified thirteen different 
flows in the packet generator. The first nine flows were 
simulating low-to-medium attack traffic for the specific 
routers we used in the test-bed networks. The three basic 
BGP Blackhole routing methods were tested against those 
nine flows. In order to achieve more accurate results, each 
experiment was run fifteen times, and then the average of 
the response time was calculated for every border router. 
Figure 22 shows the performance of these methods under the 
first nine attack flows. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Routers’ response time in the three basic BGP 
Blackhole routing methods under low-to--medium 
attack traffic 
 
This diagram shows clearly the degraded performance of 
the customer-triggered method as compared to the remote-
triggered methods of BGP Blackhole routing. This difference 
can be explained by the fact that the trigger’s iBGP 
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advertisements in the case of customer-triggered BGP 
Blackhole routing have to pass through the same loaded link 
that the attack traffic uses to approach the target. 
The destination-based and source-based methods had 
almost identical performances which remained relatively 
constant for all nine flows. Figure 23 shows the percentage 
of increase in response time with customer-triggered 
Blackhole routing, relative to the average response time of 
RTBH (destination- and source-based) routing. The maximum 
value is more than 200 percent of the response time in RTBH 
routing. Another important observation is that the response 
time of the RTBH routing in the highest flow is only 
slightly larger than the response time of the customer-




Figure 23.   Increase in response time (%) with customer-
triggered BH routing 
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C. COMPARISON OF BGP BLACKHOLE ROUTING METHODS UNDER 
DIFFERENT ROUTER CPU LOADS 
As noted previously, in test-bed networks #1 and #2 
when the attack traffic exceeded 7.55-Mbps volume, the 
behavior of the routers became unstable and the methodology 
of data collection had to be different. 
The basic difference between the low-to-medium and the 
high attack traffic was observable mainly on the target. In 
the former, all the attack traffic could approach the 
target at a constant rate. Figure 24 shows the Microsoft 
Windows Task Manager-Network tab on the target PC under 
7.55-Mbps attack traffic. 
 
 
Figure 24.   Network utilization on target PC under 7.55-
Mbps attack traffic 
 
In the case of high attack traffic, the utilization of 
the network interface on the target host followed a 
periodical pattern consisting of two parts. The first part 
had a duration of 40-45 seconds. During this period the 
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utilization was 75-76 percent, continuously. This means 
that only 7.5-Mbps to 7.6-Mbps traffic was approaching the 
target no matter how high the attack traffic that was being 
created by the packet generator.  During the second part, 
which lasted for 10 seconds, the utilization was zero and 
no traffic was able to reach the target. The most probable 
reason for this behavior is queuing and/or CPU constraints 
in the routers. This pattern is presented in Figure 25. 
 
 
Figure 25.   Network utilization on target PC under high 
attack traffic 
 
The pattern was repeated continuously for as long as 
the attack traffic was being created by the packet 
generator or until the Blackhole routing updates from the 
trigger successfully reached the border routers. 
The application of Blackhole routing had varying 
results on response time depending on how many seconds 
after the initialization of attack the appropriate commands 
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were issued on the trigger router. For this reason we 
applied Blackhole routing at four time instances — 5, 15, 
30, and 47 seconds — within one occurrence of the load 
pattern, and we measured the response time for those four 
cases. Figure 26 shows where the four time instances are 
relative to the load pattern. 
 
 
Figure 26.   Time instances of applying Blackhole routing at 
the trigger  
 
For traffic flows #10 to #13 from Table 1, we ran four 
simulations, one for each time instance. Every simulation 
was repeated ten times. The average response times 
corresponding to the different time instances are presented 
in Figures 27, 28, 29, and 30. 
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Figure 27.   Average response times in 5-second time 
instances under high attack traffic 
 
 
Figure 28.   Average response times in 15-second time 




Figure 29.   Average response times in 30-second time 
instances under high attack traffic 
 
 
Figure 30.   Average response times in 45-second time 
instances under high attack traffic 
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From the above diagrams it is obvious that the worst 
case scenario for applying Blackhole routing was the 10-
second window of zero utilization seen in Figure 25. The 
average response time for this case was in seconds, while 
in the other three cases the response time was in 
milliseconds. During our measurements the maximum value of 
response time that was recorded was 295 seconds (≈4.9 
minutes), which occurred in the customer-triggered 
Blackhole routing. 
Figure 31 shows the average response time from all 
methods related to the time slot that Blackhole routing was 
initiated. The diagram shows that for every periodic 
pattern, initially the response time dropped from about 1 
second to about 250 milliseconds. Then there is the 10-




Figure 31.   Average response time for every time slot 
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A summary of Figures 27-30 is presented in Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32.   Average response time in high attack traffic 
 
As with the low-to-medium attack traffic, the 
customer-triggered Blackhole method presents the worst 
performance. Figure 33 shows the average increase in 
response time with customer-triggered Blackhole routing as 
a percentage of the average response time of RTBH routing 
(destination- and source-based). The total average increase 
in response time is 90.92 percent. This means that when the 
customer-triggered method is used under high attack 
traffic, the response time will, on average, be 90.92 
percent larger, as compared to the response time when the 
other two methods are used. 
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Figure 33.   Percentage of increased response time with 
customer-triggered BH routing as compared to 
the average of the RTBH routing methods 
 
Figure 32 shows that, compared to the destination-
based Blackhole routing, source-based Blackhole routing 
also had degraded performance. In the low-to-medium attack 
traffic this was not the case: the performance for both 
methods was almost the same. Figure 34 shows the percentage 
of increase in response time with source-based Blackhole 
routing, as compared to destination-based Blackhole 
routing. The average total increase was 18.68 percent. 
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Figure 34.   Percentage of increased response time with 
source-based BH routing as compared to the 
destination-based BH routing 
 
As noted previously, the collection of data related to 
the routers’ CPU load wasn’t possible with the methods we 
used for the low-to-medium attack traffic. The highly 
unstable performance of the routers in high attack traffic 
indicates that the CPU load in some of the routers inside 
the network reached very high values. For this reason, we 
used the methodology explained in the previous chapter to 
calculate the CPU load of the border routers and the router 
closest to the target, which was obviously the bottleneck 
in both test-bed networks #1 and #2.  
Figure 35 presents a sample of the CPU load of those 
routers under high attack traffic. The diagram shows that 
for every periodic pattern after the first 30 seconds the 
CPU load in the bottleneck router exceeds 90 percent, and 
this fact explains the degraded performance of the 
Blackhole routing in this time area. 
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Figure 35.   Sample of routers’ CPU load under high attack 
traffic  
 
In summary, the results show that a very high CPU load 
on a router in the path used by the iBGP session can 
significantly delay Blackhole routing. Furthermore, the 
data clearly shows that the employment of the Blackhole 
routing must be as soon as possible after the initiation of 
the attack. The destination-based RTBH routing method 
performs the best in such situations. 
D. EVALUATION OF BGP BLACKHOLE ROUTING UNDER A HIGH LINK 
LOAD 
For the evaluation of BGP Blackhole routing under a 
high link load we used test-bed #3 and ten attack flows, 
from 1-Mbps up to 10-Mbps. During the initial measurements 
we realized that there was a timing boundary that divided 
the performance of Blackhole routing into two cases. The 
boundary occurred approximately 40 seconds after the 
initialization of the attack. 
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Before the timing boundary Blackhole routing had a 
relatively constant response time of about 1515 
milliseconds. Figure 36 shows the average response time 
from our measurements. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Response time before the 40-second boundary 
 
After the 40-second boundary the performance of the 
Blackhole routing was highly degraded. Figure 37 shows the 
performance of Blackhole routing in this case. 
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Figure 37.   Response time after the 40-second boundary 
 
For 1-Mbps to 3-Mbps attack traffic the response time 
had the same values as in the first case, approximately 1.5 
seconds. For 4-Mbps to 6-Mbps attack traffic the response 
time varied from 30 seconds to nearly 1 minute. For attack 
traffic of 7-Mbps or higher the response time was infinity. 
To confirm the latter result we run multiple 
simulations for 20-minute period. The Blackhole 
advertisements were not able to reach the border routers in 
any of them. Figure 38 shows the Syslog routers’ messages 
in one of those simulations.  
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Figure 38.   Syslog messages during a high-link-load BH 
routing application 
 
In this example the attack traffic was initiated at 
02:40:40. After 3 seconds we applied Blackhole routing that 
was successfully advertised and the response time was a few 
milliseconds. Seven seconds after the attack we 
successfully removed the Blackhole routing and the response 
time was slightly above 1 second. At 02:41:18, 38 seconds 
after the attack, the trigger router sent an OSPF message 
saying the neighbor was down, meaning that the connection 




last OSPF message, the other routers started sending BGP 
messages declaring the various connections to their BGP 
neighbors, from Established to Closing. 
This sequence explains the problematic performance of 
BGP Blackhole routing under a very high link load. The 
default “dead-timer” for OSPF is 40 seconds. If there is no 
reply during this period, OSPF considers the links dead and 
updates the routing table by removing the related entries. 
That causes the TCP to fail and, since the iBGP session 
uses TCP, it also fails. The default “keep-alive” timer for 
BGP is 120 seconds. After that period, BGP declares that 
the connections to neighbors are closed. The final result 
is that there are no BGP updates for as long as the 
situation remains the same, which means that there is no 
way to successfully apply BGP Blackhole routing. 
This was one of the most important results of our 
research because it showed for the first time that there 
are situations in which BGP Blackhole routing will not be 
at all effective. 
E. EVALUATION OF THE ROUTERS’ PRECONFIGURATION FOR THE 
THREE BASIC BGP BLACKHOLE ROUTING METHODS 
To evaluate the effect of Blackhole routing pre-
configuration on a router, we applied attack traffic in 
test-bed networks #1 and #2. Then we measured the CPU load 
for every router before the initialization of the Blackhole 
routing. Figures 39, 40, and 41 present these measurements. 
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Figure 39.   Routers’ CPU load before application of 
destination-based RTBH routing 
 
 
Figure 40.   Routers’ CPU load before application of source-




Figure 41.   Routers’ CPU load before application of 
customer-triggered Blackhole routing 
 
In the above three diagrams, Router 2, though it 
handles 50 percent more traffic than Router 1, presents 
only a slight increase in its CPU load as compared to 
Router 1. In Figure 41 the trigger router presents a 
significantly greater CPU load as compared to Router 2, 
though both handle the same amount of traffic. This 
difference can be explained by the fact that Router 2 was a 
more capable model (Cisco 3600) than the other routers 
(Cisco 2621XMs). The difference in the CPU load of these 
two models is presented in Figures 42 and 43. 
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Figure 42.   Difference in CPU load of the Cisco 2621XM 




Figure 43.   Percentage of increased CPU load in the Cisco 




For a maximum attack traffic of 7.55-Mbps, the 
difference in the CPU load reached 23 percent. On average, 
the Cisco 2621XM router had a 44-percent larger CPU load 
than the Cisco 3600 router under the same traffic. 
As noted previously, the behavior of the routers under 
more than 7.55-Mbps attack traffic became unstable and the 
response time increased significantly. This can be 
explained partly as a result of the lower performance of 
the Cisco 2621XM model. It also shows how important the 
performance of the routers used in a network is in 
defending against DDoS attacks. 













Figure 46.   Router 2 CPU load before application of BH 
routing 
 
Figures 45 and 46 show that the internal routers had 
the same CPU load in every Blackhole routing method. This 
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result was expected since the configuration of those 
routers didn’t need to change for the Blackhole routing. 
Figure 44 also shows, however, that the border routers had 
an increased CPU load for the same traffic when they were 
configured to apply source-based RTBH routing. The 
percentage of the increased CPU load was 33.33 percent, 
which remained constant for all variations of the attack 
traffic. 
The reason for the significant differences in the CPU 
load is that unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) was 
applied in every border router when source-based Blackhole 
routing was used. Depending on the entries in the uRPF 
table, the percent of the increased CPU load may vary. We 
assumed that, before an application of Blackhole routing, 
most network administrators would keep the uRPF table 
minimal, as we did. This assumption led us to conclude 
that, on average, the configuration of source-based 
Blackhole routing will create a constant 33.33 percent 
larger CPU load on border routers. This is a significant 
factor that network administrators must consider before 
applying this method. 
Since uRPF affects the CPU load before the application 
of Blackhole routing, intuition suggests that there should 
also be some kind of affect on the CPU load after the 
application of Blackhole routing. We therefore measured the 
border routers’ CPU load under different attack flows after 
the successful application of both source- and destination-
based RTBH routing. Figure 47 shows the data collected from 
the Right border router in test-bed network #1. 
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Figure 47.   Right border router CPU load after application 
of source- and destination-based RTBH routing 
 
Figure 48 shows the percentage of increase in the CPU 
load of the destination-based BH method as compared to the 
source-based BH method. The average increase was 28.5 
percent. 
The reason for this difference in CPU load is, again, 
the uRPF, but this time it works in favor of the source-
based BH routing method. Since the uRPF process examines 
the packets first and the entries in the uRPF table are 
very few (just one in our simulation), the process of 
dropping packets with the source-based BH is faster than 
with the destination-based BH. Thus the CPU load is lower 
for the source-based BH. This is another significant factor 
that affects the choice of the most appropriate BH method 




Figure 48.   Percentage of increased CPU load in 
destination-based method as compared to the 
source-based method 
 
In the next chapter we summarize the results presented 
in this chapter and propose potential future research 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Using real test-bed networks, this study evaluated the 
performance of three BGP Blackhole routing methods in terms 
of their response time. The networks were put under 
stressful situations in which either the router CPU 
capacity or the link capacity for the iBGP session became a 
bottleneck. This evaluation produced the following 
conclusions: 
First, we concluded that, of the two limiting factors 
inside a network, the CPU load and the link load, only the 
link load greatly degrades the performance of BGP Blackhole 
routing. We demonstrated, for the first time, that the 
router response time in high-link-load situations boosts to 
infinity. In practical terms, this means that BH routing is 
ineffective in defending against DDoS attacks in cases of 
high link loads. On the other hand, a high CPU load 
increased the response time from milliseconds to minutes, 
but in all our simulations the iBGP messages from the 
trigger were able to finally reach the border routers. 
Second, we concluded that, of the three basic BGP 
Blackhole routing methods, the customer-triggered method 
has the worst performance. Our simulations for this method 
showed that, under low-to-medium attack traffic, the router 
response time reached values of more than 200 percent on 
average, compared to the average of the other two methods. 
Furthermore, for the same method under high attack traffic, 
the response time reached values of almost 100 percent 
compared to the destination-based BH routing. 
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Third, we found that, the best of the three methods is 
the destination-based BH routing. In almost all of the 
simulations, this method showed better performance in both 
response time and in the CPU load. The only exception to 
this occurred when we compared the CPU load after 
successful application of the BH routing. In that case, the 
source-based BH routing had a better CPU load by 28.5 
percent on average. 
The source-based BH routing’s standing falls between 
the other two methods, but is closest to the destination-
based method. In low-to-medium attack traffic it showed the 
same performance in terms of the CPU load, but in high 
attack traffic the same metric had slightly higher values. 
A significant disadvantage of this method is that, by 
applying uRPF in a router’s interface, under normal 
operation the CPU load is increased. 
The last conclusion of this research is that the 
timing of the application of the BGP Blackhole routing is 
very important in the case of either high link load or high 
CPU load. Especially in the high link load case the 
simulations showed that employment of BGP Blackhole would 
be totally inefficient if applied 40 seconds or more after 
the DDoS attack initialization. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Our thesis results provide new opportunities and space 
for further study. Research in the following areas will 
provide more complete knowledge about BGP Blackhole 
routing. 
1. As noted previously in this study, we assumed 
that a given DDoS attack had been positively identified by 
either an automated system or a human operator. The ability 
73 
to automatically identify an attack using an IDS/IPS system 
would greatly improve the performance of BGP Blackhole 
routing. As the research in this field to date is limited, 
it is our first suggested area for future work. 
2. In this study we mainly used medium performance 
Cisco routers and only one Juniper router. But the 
probability that in a large network, routers of both 
vendors will co-exist is very high. Thus, another potential 
area of future study could involve evaluating the degree of 
interoperability of routers from different vendors that 
must all work together to apply BGP Blackhole routing. 
3. Finally, this study showed that, due to the 
principles of TCP, OSPF, and BGP protocols in high link 
loads, the performance of BGP Blackhole routing is very 
degraded. More research in this area, therefore, would be 
very useful in showing how best to bypass the limitations 
of those protocols and in providing a solution that would 
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APPENDIX A. CONFIGURATION FILES: TEST-BED NETWORK 
#1 ROUTERS 
Appendix A presents the configuration files for test-
bed network #1’s routers: one internal router, one border 
router, and the trigger router. 
Internal Router #1: 
! 
! Last configuration change at 06:53:45 UTC Sun Mar 14 1993 
! NVRAM config last updated at 06:54:26 UTC Sun Mar 14 1993 
! 
version 12.3 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 







no logging console 
! 
no network-clock-participate slot 1  
no network-clock-participate wic 0  






 no ip address 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 no ip address 
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 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 












 ip address 192.168.7.1 255.255.255.0 
 full-duplex 
! 
router ospf 200 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 redistribute connected 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
! 




snmp-server community nikos RW 
! 
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line con 0 
 exec-timeout 35791 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 login 
! 
ntp clock-period 17179859 




Left border router: 
! 
version 12.3 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 







no logging console 
! 
no network-clock-participate slot 1  
no network-clock-participate wic 0  










 no ip unreachables 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 









 ip address 192.200.1.2 255.255.255.0 








router ospf 200 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 redistribute connected 
 redistribute static 
79 
 redistribute bgp 100 
 passive-interface Ethernet1/2 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
! 
router bgp 100 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 mask 255.255.0.0 
 neighbor 192.168.100.2 remote-as 100 
 no auto-summary 
! 
no ip http server 
ip classless 
ip route 192.0.2.0 255.255.255.0 Null0 
! 
! 
logging trap debugging 
logging facility local0 
logging source-interface Loopback0 
logging 192.168.5.2 
snmp-server community nikos RW 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 35791 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 login 
! 
ntp clock-period 17180042 






! Last configuration change at 07:57:00 UTC Thu Mar 4 1993 




service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 







no logging console 
! 
no network-clock-participate slot 1  
no network-clock-participate wic 0  






 no ip address 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 



















router ospf 200 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
! 
router bgp 100 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 redistribute static route-map StaticToBGP 
 neighbor 192.168.2.1 remote-as 100 
 neighbor 192.168.6.2 remote-as 100 
 neighbor 192.168.7.2 remote-as 100 
 no auto-summary 
! 




logging trap debugging 
logging facility local3 
logging source-interface Loopback0 
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logging 192.168.5.2 
route-map StaticToBGP permit 10 
 match tag 20 
 set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1 
 set local-preference 50 
 set origin igp 
 set community no-export 
! 
route-map StaticToBGP permit 20 
! 
snmp-server community nikos RW 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 35791 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 login 
! 





APPENDIX B. CONFIGURATION FILES: TEST-BED NETWORK 
#2 ROUTERS 
Appendix B presents the configuration file of the 
trigger router for test-bed network #2: 
 
! 
! Last configuration change at 09:49:19 UTC Thu Mar 4 1993 
! NVRAM config last updated at 09:44:32 UTC Thu Mar 4 1993 
! 
version 12.3 
service timestamps debug datetime msec 
service timestamps log datetime msec 







no logging console 
! 
no network-clock-participate slot 1  
no network-clock-participate wic 0  






 no ip address 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/0 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
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 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface FastEthernet0/1 
 no ip address 
 shutdown 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
! 
interface Ethernet1/0 

















router ospf 200 
 log-adjacency-changes 
 network 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255 area 0 
! 
router bgp 100 
 no synchronization 
 bgp log-neighbor-changes 
 redistribute static route-map StaticToBGP 
 neighbor 192.168.2.1 remote-as 100 
 neighbor 192.168.6.2 remote-as 100 
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 neighbor 192.168.7.2 remote-as 100 
 no auto-summary 
! 




logging trap debugging 
logging facility local3 
logging source-interface Loopback0 
logging 192.168.5.2 
route-map StaticToBGP permit 10 
 match tag 20 
 set ip next-hop 192.0.2.1 
 set local-preference 50 
 set origin igp 
 set community no-export 
! 
route-map StaticToBGP permit 20 
! 
snmp-server community nikos RW 
! 
line con 0 
 exec-timeout 35791 0 
line aux 0 
line vty 0 4 
 login 
! 
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APPENDIX C. CONFIGURATION FILES: TEST-BED NETWORK 
#3 ROUTERS 
Appendix C presents the configuration file of the 




    host-name j43; 
    root-authentication { 
        encrypted-password "$1$EEuNurtm$oZk6BaPntQac9CNwiYUeK."; 
## SECRET-DATA 
    } 
    login { 
        user j43 { 
            uid 2000; 
            class superuser; 
            authentication { 
                encrypted-password 
"$1$M0NSaWol$urTrVGSc7gBFZ64RNguyA/"; ## SECRET-DATA 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    services { 
        ssh; 
        telnet; 
        web-management { 
            http; 
        } 
    } 
    syslog { 
        user * { 
            any emergency; 
        } 
        file messages { 
            any any; 
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            authorization info; 
        } 
        file interactive-commands { 
            interactive-commands any; 
        } 
    } 
    ntp { 
        server 192.168.100.2; 
    } 
} 
interfaces { 
    fe-0/0/0 { 
        speed 10m; 
        link-mode full-duplex; 
        unit 0 { 
            family inet { 
                address 192.168.2.2/24; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    fe-0/0/1 { 
        speed 100m; 
        link-mode full-duplex; 
        unit 0 { 
            family inet { 
                address 192.168.200.1/24; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    fe-1/0/0 { 
        speed 10m; 
        link-mode full-duplex; 
        unit 0 { 
            family inet { 
                address 192.168.100.1/24; 
            } 
        } 
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    } 
    ## 
    ## Warning: requires an additional 'if-fe' license 
    ## 
    fe-1/0/1 { 
        unit 0 { 
            family inet { 
                address 192.168.5.1/24; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    fe-5/0/0 { 
        speed 10m; 
        link-mode full-duplex; 
        unit 0 { 
            family inet { 
                address 192.168.7.2/24; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    ## 
    ## Warning: requires an additional 'if-fe' license 
    ## 
    fe-5/0/1 { 
        speed 10m; 
        link-mode full-duplex; 
        unit 0 { 
            family inet { 
                address 192.168.6.2/24; 
            } 
        } 
    } 
    lo0 { 
        unit 0 { 
            family inet { 
                address 127.0.0.1/32; 
            } 
90 
        } 
    } 
} 
snmp { 
    community nikos { 
        authorization read-write; 
    } 
} 
protocols { 
    ospf { 
        area 0.0.0.0 { 
            interface all; 
        } 
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